Selfish Attacks in Two-hop IEEE 802.11 Relay Networks: Impact and
  Countermeasures by Szott, Szymon & Konorski, Jerzy
1Selfish Attacks in Two-hop IEEE 802.11 Relay
Networks: Impact and Countermeasures
Szymon Szott and Jerzy Konorski
Abstract—In IEEE 802.11 networks, selfish stations can pursue
a better quality of service (QoS) through selfish MAC-layer at-
tacks. Such attacks are easy to perform, secure routing protocols
do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex. Two-
hop relay topologies allow a new angle of attack: a selfish relay
can tamper with either source traffic, transit traffic, or both. We
consider the applicability of selfish attacks and their variants
in the two-hop relay topology, quantify their impact, and study
defense measures.
Index Terms—Relay networks, IEEE 802.11, EDCA, QoS,
game theory, selfish behavior, traffic remapping
I. INTRODUCTION
THE coverage of IEEE 802.11 networks can be extendedif stations connected to an access point (AP) act as
relays, i.e., they share their connection with other, neighboring
stations, who either cannot reach the AP themselves or have
a poor direct connection to it. This approach creates a two-
hop relay network (Fig. 1) which is known to have many
advantages in terms of network coverage and performance [1].
A two-hop relay network requires cooperation from the
relay station. If it declares cooperation, the relay may gain
a privileged status at the AP, e.g., enjoying better terms of
network access. In the following, we consider the specific
case that the AP is a public hotspot and Internet access is
granted free-of-charge provided that all one-hop connected
stations act as relays to improve network performance1. In
this setting, the relay may now be motivated to launch selfish
attacks resulting in preferential treatment for its own (source)
traffic over relayed (transit) traffic, hence to achieve an undue
(and possibly undetected) increase of the quality of service
(QoS) [2].
Selfish attacks can be launched in two ways. First, packet
scheduling in the forwarding path can be biased in favor of
source traffic. Second, source packets can be unduly prioritized
at the MAC-layer. Since it is the MAC mechanisms that
ultimately decide the order and delays of medium acquisition
by successive packets (Section II), in what follows we focus
on MAC-layer attacks defined in Section III.
Selfish MAC-layer attacks pose a serious threat to IEEE
802.11 networks: they are easy to perform, secure routing
protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be
complex [2]. These attacks have been studied in single-hop
networks [2]. However, the two-hop relay topology adds
another dimension to the problem, in that the relay can tamper
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1Technically, this requires that the relay act as a router, using either the
path selection protocol of 802.11s or any ad hoc routing protocol.
High quality link
Access Point
Station BStation A
Flow T
Fig. 1: Conceptual setting for selfish attacks in a two-hop relay network
(all nodes with one wireless interface communicating on a single channel,
neighboring nodes within carrier sensing range). Station A, as the relay, can
increase its QoS perception by executing a selfish attack: upgrading source
traffic (flow S), downgrading transit traffic (flow T ), or both.
with either source traffic, or transit traffic, or both (Fig. 1). We
consider the applicability of these attacks and their variants in
the two-hop relay topology (Section IV), quantify their impact
(Section V), and study defense measures (Section VI). In
our view, the presented attack scenario and proposed defence
measures can serve as a useful analytical framework in any
2-hop configuration with a relay, in particular envisaged for
5G femtocells, regardless of the routing protocol and TRA
method used.
II. QOS PROVISIONING IN IEEE 802.11 NETWORKS
QoS provisioning in IEEE 802.11 is achieved through the
enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) function, where
higher-layer traffic classes are mapped to queues of one of
four access categories (ACs). The ACs, in order of decreasing
priority, are voice (VO), video (VI), best effort (BE), and
background (BK). The configuration of each AC provides
statistical prioritization with respect to channel access and
duration [2].
Traffic classification into ACs is based on the Differentiated
Services Code Point (DSCP) set in a packet’s IP header: in
the Type of Service (ToS) field in IPv4 or Traffic
Class (TC) field in IPv6. DSCP values can be configured
according to higher-layer policies, using network-layer packet
mangling software (such as Linux iptables) for all packets
belonging to a given flow.
III. SELFISH ATTACKS IN IEEE 802.11 NETWORKS
The QoS provisioning model of IEEE 802.11 networks
enables two types of selfish attacks: backoff attacks (BOAs)
and traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Both can be executed
either as source traffic upgrading or transit traffic downgrading
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2(Fig. 1), which we denote (+) and (−), respectively. We
consider only BOAs and TRAs because they are relatively
easy to execute, in contrast to, e.g., forging frame headers [2].
A. Backoff Attacks
BOAs belong to the class of MAC parameter manipulation
attacks – out of the available medium access parameters the
contention window (CW) has proved to be the easiest to
manipulate [3], [4]. The CW governs the backoff mechanism,
wherein each station backs off before accessing the channel
by waiting a random number of time slots. An attacker may
attempt to influence this random behavior so as to improve
its QoS, either by decreasing CW for the AC of source traffic
(BOA+) or increasing it for transit traffic (BOA−).
BOAs have two key advantages. First, modifying MAC
parameters is often available as part a user’s configuration
interface. Second, detecting BOAs is challenging due to both
the randomness inherent to the backoff function as well as the
practical difficulties in performing precise time measurements.
The BOA+ attack has mostly been studied in a single-hop
infrastructure-based 802.11s setting and shown to effectively
promote the attacker’s traffic [3]. In a two-hop topology, a
BOA− can additionally be applied to transit traffic to dis-
criminate it in favor of source traffic. Research is required
to quantify the impact of BOAs in two-hop relay settings.
B. Traffic Remapping Attacks
TRAs consist in claiming a different medium access priority
through false DSCP settings so that traffic can be mapped onto
a different AC. TRAs are simpler to perform than BOAs: a user
application can access packet mangling software to change the
current DSCP of any packet.
Upgrading TRAs (TRA+) have been studied in single-
hop ad hoc networks [2], where a distributed discouragement
scheme, based on the threat of detection and punishment,
allows TRAs only if they are harmless to honest stations;
otherwise it induces selfish stations to learn that a long-
sustained TRA is counterproductive. For relay networks, TRAs
can be performed also on transit traffic to lower its priority
(TRA−). Such a possibility has thus far only been studied in
a multi-hop ad hoc network [5], necessitating further research
for the specific two-hop relay setting.
IV. TWO-HOP RELAY TOPOLOGY
We make the following assumptions for analyzing the net-
work in Fig. 1. Station B and the AP are out of communication
range. The placement of A in the topology allows the execu-
tion of any one of the previously discussed attacks. For ease
of presentation we reduce the configuration space assuming
that only two ACs are used: VO and BE. We consider the
traffic transmitted in these ACs as a generic representation
of high and low priority traffic, respectively. The interesting
case for analysis is when, at A, the transit flow T is VO and
the source flow S is BE. We evaluate the attack performance
under saturation. We consider TCP because saturated UDP
traffic causes a fairness problem – if a station’s queue is full
of source traffic then it drops all transit traffic. This is not the
case for the self-regulating TCP.
TABLE I: Comparison of attacker’s MAC-layer configuration for the BOAs
and TRAs in the setting of Fig. 1. The last two columns indicate, respectively,
which EDCA queue is used and what is its configuration. The latter denotes
priority in medium access during frame transmission, the former – the QoS
designation of the frames.
Attack strategy Flow,intrinsic AC
AC queue
used
Queue
configured as
None
(honest behavior)
T, VO VO VO
S, BE BE BE
BOA+ T, VO VO VOS, BE BE VO
BOA− T, VO VO BES, BE BE BE
TRA+ T, VO VO VOS, BE VO VO
TRA− T, VO BE BES, BE BE BE
2xTRA
(TRA+ and TRA−)
T, VO BE BE
S, BE VO VO
A. Uplink and Downlink Scenarios
In the uplink scenario, there are two saturated TCP data
flows terminating at the AP upon which A can execute the
attacks: S, referred to as the source flow, and T , referred to as
the transit flow. A’s goal is to improve its uplink throughput
(i.e., that of S). There are also traffic flows carrying TCP ACK
segments in the reverse direction: S′ and T ′ (omitted from
Fig. 1 for clarity). These two flows are important: although
they have a low rate, they impact the time spacing of the TCP
data and thus end-to-end throughput of flows S and T .
A downlink scenario can also be considered, where the
saturated TCP data flows are T and S′. Note that again A can
directly influence T and S, the latter now consisting of TCP
ACKs for flow S′. A’s goal is now to improve its downlink
throughput (i.e., that of S′). Whether MAC-layer attacks can
have any impact on downlink throughput for two-hop relay
settings is an open question that we want to address.
B. Attack Strategies
For each attack strategy it is helpful to specify which AC
queues are used at the attacker, how they are configured, and
which traffic is sent using which AC (Table I). For BOAs,
we assume that AC queues are configured with valid EDCA
parameters, e.g., in BOA+ the BE queue is configured with
VO parameters. Note that BOA+ and TRA+ differ in their
effects even though they share the same configuration for S
and T ; similarly for BOA− and TRA−. This is because under
BOA+ and BOA− both AC queues are used, whereas TRA+
and TRA− merge source and transit traffic into a single AC
queue, causing less inter-queue contention at the MAC layer.
They also modify the QoS designation of each packet, which
impacts its end-to-end as well as TCP ACK transmission
priority, whereas BOA+ and BOA− have local impact only.
BOAs and TRAs can also be combined into more so-
phisticated attack strategies. In particular, BOA+ and BOA−
(2xBOA) can be combined to produce a priority switch be-
tween the source and transit traffic flows (S and T). A similar
3priority switch is produced by a combination of TRA+ and
TRA− (2xTRA).
In combinations of BOA and TRA, the TRA component
assigns both flows to the same AC queue, for which the
BOA component increases or decreases CW and other EDCA
parameters. Thus the provided QoS is the same for both
flows and only depends on the effectiveness of the underlying
contention resolution. Hence, combinations of BOA and TRA
come under performance optimization rather than network
security, and as such are outside our scope. Henceforth we
consider only 2xBOA and 2xTRA.
V. ATTACK IMPACT ANALYSIS
To study the impact of the considered attacks we used the
ns-2.28 simulator. A multi-hop IEEE 802.11b2 network served
the three stations in Fig. 1. Important simulation settings
include: enabling Request to Send/Clear to Send, setting
transmission and interference range at one and two hops,
respectively, using ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing,
generating 1000-byte data packets, and using transmission
queues of 50 packets. Simulations lasted 90 s (with a 15 s
warm-up). Each data point is the mean of 20 experiment runs.
The provided QoS is defined based on a flow’s intrinsic
AC: as packet delay for VO traffic, i.e., T (which according to
ITU-T recommendations should not exceed 100 ms), and as
achieved throughput for BE traffic, i.e., S or S′ in the uplink or
downlink scenario, respectively. The selfish relay A attempts
to maximize the throughput of S or S′ at the cost of the
victim flow T while maintaining a low risk of detection. We
have simulated all attack strategies available to A (Table I).
We have omitted from the figures attack strategies combining
BOA and TRA (indicated above as out of scope), as well as
2xBOA, which was found only a marginal improvement over
stand-alone BOA− (the contribution of BOA+ turned out to be
negligible).
A. Uplink Scenario
In the uplink scenario, from A’s perspective, significant
throughput gains of S can be achieved by attacking (Fig. 2a).
However, it is visible that BOA+ (where A uses both BE and
VO queues configured with VO parameters) is not beneficial
in two-hop relay settings. The reason is that, in addition to the
inter-queue contention that worsens the overall performance,
the VO queue used by T retains its relative priority: the TCP
ACKs for T are handled as VO traffic at the AP, creating
a smaller round-trip time than that experienced by S (whose
TCP ACKs are handled as BE traffic). Under TRA+, flow S
approaches the throughput achieved by T with A’s honest be-
havior (the reference line in Fig. 2b). The downgrading attacks
provide even better gains, which supports the hypothesis that
upgrading source traffic is less important than downgrading
transit traffic and elimination of inter-queue contention (note
that compared to BOA−, TRA− yields slightly better gains
because it causes the AP to handle TCP ACKs for T as BE
traffic). However, 2xTRA is strikingly beneficial.
2Simulations were also performed for newer IEEE 802.11 physical layers
with the same qualitative results.
The throughput gains of S are accompanied by the loss
in throughput by T (Fig. 2b). In most cases the loss ranges
between 30% and 50% with the exception of 2xTRA, where
90% of the throughput is lost. Delay in all but the last case
is below the ITU-T requirement of 100 ms (Fig. 2c). This
shows that some selfish attacks can be harmless (inflict no
QoS degradation for T), even in saturation conditions.
B. Downlink Scenario
In the downlink scenario both BOA+ and TRA+ provide a
small (3–5%) throughput gain for S′ by increasing the sending
rate of the corresponding TCP ACKs at the price of increased
collision rate due to smaller CW values (Fig. 2d). BOA−
and TRA− reduce the collision rate due to larger CW values,
therefore are much more beneficial for A; BOA− slightly less
so because, cf. Section V-A, the VO queue used by T still has
relative priority despite being configured with BE parameters,
whereas TRA− eliminates the inter-queue contention at A.
Unexpectedly for A, 2xTRA performs no better than TRA−.
The reason is that the TRA+ component has TCP ACKs for
flow S′ handled as VO traffic at A. Thus S′ experiences a
lower round-trip time and its transmit window is excessively
expanded; the resulting increased collisions between AP and
relay transmissions ultimately lower the throughput of S′. In
all considered downlink cases, T’s delay, though sometimes
elevated beyond the reference value (representing A’s honest
behavior), meets the ITU-T requirement of 100 ms (Fig. 2f).
VI. DEFENSE MEASURES
Once detected [2], [4], selfish MAC-layer attacks launched
by the relay station A cannot be simply punished by banning
the attacker from further communication (by deauthentication
and blacklisting), as this would mean loss of network access
for station B. Revoking A’s privileged status at the AP is
one possibility. However, a more convenient, self-regulatory
approach would be to provide incentives for A’s honest co-
operation. For example, if the AP suspects an ongoing attack
launched by A, it can drop ACK frames for its source packets
or shape its source traffic; both these punishment measures
can be considered a subtle form of denial of service. We
evaluate them in the topology of Fig. 1 in the uplink scenario
to show that they involve only a small computational overhead
on behalf of the punisher AP and no transmission overhead at
all.
The first measure, dropping ACK frames [3], has the
punisher refrain from sending MAC-layer ACK frames for
correctly received data frames but only those belonging to
the attacker’s flow (S in the uplink scenario and S′ in the
downlink scenario). The degree of penalty can be scaled by
acknowledging an α ∈ [0, 1] portion of frames.
The second measure, traffic shaping, has the punisher apply
traffic control to TCP flows related to the attacker’s traffic (S
in the uplink and S′ in the downlink scenario), e.g., in the form
of a leaky bucket filter with a controlled output rate. This rate
can be proportional, by α ∈ [0, 1], to the attacker’s rate during
an attack, so that for α = 1 the throughput of S is equal to
that shown in Fig. 2a.
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Fig. 2: Impact of A’s attack strategy in the uplink (top) and downlink (bottom) scenario of the Fig. 1 topology: throughput of S/S′ (left), throughput of
T (middle), and delay of T (right). Throughput is normalized to the PHY data rate. 95% confidence intervals are either shown or too small for graphical
representation. The reference line is for the case of A’s honest behavior.
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Fig. 3: Change of throughput of S caused by punishment at the AP in
comparison to unpunished attack.
The results presented in Fig. 3 show that ACK dropping
was able to scale S’s throughput for the downgrading attacks.
However, for the upgrading attacks, dropping ACKs can
inadvertently optimize S’s TCP flow with respect to the effect
of hidden stations3 and thus cause an unexpected increase
of S’s throughput for α ∈ [0.4, 0.9]. We have also evaluated
the performance of flow T (not shown) and observed that for
TRA− the throughput is reduced for both S and T ; clearly,
ACK dropping has caused network performance degradation.
In contrast, traffic shaping allowed to selectively (and almost
linearly) control the throughput of S. Similar results (not
presented here) were obtained in the downlink scenarios.
3Careful pacing of TCP transmissions could improve flow S’s performance
in the presence of hidden stations even without ACK dropping, although it
might necessitate cross-layer optimization [6].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude the following: 1) except for 2xTRA in the
uplink scenario, station A’s selfish attacks were found harm-
less, since they did not violate the QoS requirements of high-
priority traffic, 2) unlike in single-hop networksBOA+ brings
the attacker no benefit in two-hop relay networks because it
does not modify the packet’s QoS designation, 3) downgrading
attacks outperform their upgrading counterparts (particularly
in the downlink scenario), while combined attack strategies
were found to be only beneficial in one case (2xTRA in
uplink), 4) simple ACK dropping is not a valid punishment
in two-hop relay networks because of its unpredictable behav-
ior; certainly, more sophisticated ACK dropping needs to be
studied in the future. Future work should also consider more
advanced incentive methods for relays, practical evaluation of
the proposed defense methods both under TCP and UDP traf-
fic, and analysis of new attack vectors enabled by 802.11ac/ax.
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